Book Review of The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World written by Alan Greenspan by Looney, Robert
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2007
Book Review:  The Age of Turbulence: 





The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World 
Author: Alan Greenspan 
Publisher: The Penguin Press, 2007
Alan Greenspan was appointed chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal 
Reserve on August 11, 1987. For most of his 18 
years at the Fed he was widely regarded as the infall
lible oracle of economic policy. True to its origins, 
during this period the Fed remained a somewhat 
secretive or at least opaque organization.  Howl
ever, with the publication of The Age of Turbulence: 
Adventures in a New World, outsiders are provided 
with a glimpse of the Fed’s inner workings, its 
economic theories and, most importantly, the unl
derlying philosophies upon which major decisions 
were based. 
The common image of Alan Greenspan 
is a brilliant but rather cryptic man, who, as the 
world’s most important central banker, developed 
convoluted, ambiguous language into an art form. 
As legend has it, when a listener to one of his 
speeches began a question by saying “If I have unl
derstood you clearly, Mr. Chairman,” Greenspan 
answered wryly that if the listener had understood 
him clearly then he (Greenspan) hadn’t been doing 
his job properly. Perhaps for this reason, The Age 
of Turbulence was 
ghost written by 
Peter Petre (who 
also wrote the aul
tobiographies of 
Gen. H. Norman 
Schwartzkopf and IBM head Thomas J. Watson 
Jr.).To his credit, Petre has risen to the challenge of 
translating a potentially dry treatise full of arcane 
“Fed Speak” and “Greenspanese” into something 
rather enjoyable even for the uninitiated.  
Greenspan’s timing of his memoirs, like many 
of his policies, couldn’t have been more opportune 
– they appeared just when interest in financial turl
bulence brought on by the sublprime lending crisis 
was approaching a zenith. Within several weeks of 
its release, the book topped the New York Times 
bestlseller list. No doubt this was a great relief for 
his publisher who reportedly paid $8 million for 
the publication rights. 
The Age of Turbulence is divided into three 
main parts – each with a somewhat different tone 
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part is largely personal starting with Greenspan’s 
early boyhood years in New York City. Here many 
readers will no doubt be surprised to learn that his 
early ambitions were to be a professional baseball 
player followed by hopes of a music career – a prol
fessionallcaliber jazz clarinetist. Also included are 
fascinating accounts from his later years as an ecol
nomic consultant/forecaster and as an advisor to 
Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, George Walker 
Bush, Clinton, and the current president Bush. He 
hands out grades – Nixon the crudest, Ford the 
most decent, and Clinton the smartest. 
 The second part provides Greenspan’s 
view of the world – how his economic framework 
evolved to address the challenges of an increasingly 
globalized world with its rapidly evolving financial 
markets. Here we learn the two big influences on 
his thinking and approach to policy were econol
mist Joseph Schumpeter, who thought ‘creative 
destruction’ was the lifeblood of market capitalism, 
and libertarian Ayn Rand from whom he derived 
his overlriding preference for free, unregulated 
markets.
The third part – Greenspan’s account of 
public policy – will be of most interest to many. 
Certainly it is most often quoted in the media. A 
lifellong Republican himself, Greenspan criticizes 
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick 
Cheney and the Republican Partylcontrolled Conl
gress for abandoning the Republican Party’s tradil
tional tenets of fiscal discipline. Greenspan’s critil
cisms of President Bush include his refusal to veto 
new Federal legislation, thus increasing spending 
with unprecedented ease.  In Greenspan’s opinion, 
Bush’s approach to dealing with the Congress has 
been one of “conflict avoidance”, and fulfilling pol
litical promises/agendas with little room for coml
promise or reason. “They swapped principle for 
power. They ended up with neither. They deserved 
to lose the 006 election.”  
For the professional economist and Fed 
watchers, perhaps the most intriguing sections are 
those in which Greenspan mounts a defense of 
his tenure as Fed chief.  Critics have leveled four 
specific charges against his policy reign: (1) that 
he should not have, but did, support the Bush tax 
cut of 001; () that he should not have, but did, 
encourage new US homeowners to get adjustl
ablelrate mortgages in the early 000s; (3) that he 
should have done something to abort the dotlcom 
bubble of the late 1990s; and (4) that he should 
have done something to prevent the real estate 
bubble of the 000s.
Greenspan’s defense on the tax cut is compell
ling – his support for this measure was conditional 
on the assumption of budget checks and spending 
restraints to be put in place to prevent budget defil
cits. The media by overlooking these caveats misl
interpreted his position for a blanket endorsement. 
As for the second charge, he admits that he did 
not properly understand in the early 000s the big 
effect low interest rates and prepayment penalties 
would have in luring new and financially strapped 
homeowners into deals that were not in their best 
interest.
 With the first two charges disposed of, 
he appears to stumble a bit on the final two. He 
notes that given the state of investor psychology, 
he could have aborted the stock market and housl
ing bubbles of the late 1990s and the early 000s 
but only by paying an unacceptable price in idled 
factories and unemployed workers. This is a bit 
inconsistent with his argument at the time that 
fast productivity growth and the flexibility of the 
American economy meant that risks could be takl
en with inflation. In any case, the record shows he 
always chose to err on the side of low interest rates 
and loose monetary policy. 
Here is where Greenspan’s uncompromising 
preference for free market forces may have let him 
down. As suggested above, under Greenspan a mal
jor transformation of monetary policy took place. 
Prior to 1980, monetary policy was significantly 
driven by labor market concerns and in many rel
gards worked hand in hand with the other elel
ments of the policy apparatus to put a floor under 
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labor markets. Under Greenspan monetary policy 
became increasingly expansionary. At the same 
time, the financial deregulation process started in 
the late 1970s resulted in ever more sophisticated 
financial markets. The Fed responded by shifting 
its priorities from protecting employment to that 
of assuring financial values.
The net result of these developments was to 
weaken the Fed’s ability to cope with asset bubbles. 
Once the equity bubble burst in the late 1990s, the 
Fed was forced into a postlbubble, liquiditylgenl
erating defense that gave rise to one bubble after 
another. Through a debtlintensive process of eql
uity extraction, this string of bubbles then became 
the driving force supporting America’s excess conl
sumption binge.  The result was a record overhang 
of household sector indebtedness – thereby injectl
ing a new element of systemic risk into the US 
economy.  Saving rates fell forcing the US to draw 
on surplus saving from abroad, the net result being 
the unprecedented global imbalances many feel 
represent an additional element of instability. 
Under Greenspan, these developments 
spawned a new type of business cycle characterized 
by deindustrialization, overvaluation of the dollar, 
record trade deficits, widening income inequality 
and stock market and housing price appreciation 
that have supported record consumer debt burl
dens. The foundation of this cycle has been finanl
cial booms and cheap imports. The financial boom 
provides consumers with borrowed finance that 
funds spending, while the overvalued dollar and 
associated cheap imports ameliorate the impact 
of widening income inequality deindustrialization 
and periodic bouts of increased income insecurity.
Clearly the process of transformation that took 
place under his guidance has provided an economic 
shot in the arm as American households have used 
their enhanced access to credit to finance increased 
consumption spending. The open question is what 
the longlterm consequences of this increased finanl
cial access will be given the fact the Fed may be losl
ing some control over the process. Specifically the 
combination of systemic risks and a serious moral 
hazard dilemma (the temptation of the Fed to bail 
out financial institutions facing collapse) built up 
under Greenspan appears to be constraining Fed 
policy perhaps even to the point of compromising 
monetary policy. Will the Fed simply let most of 
the institutions specializing in sublprime loans just 
go under or will it be compelled to validate greed 
and poor business decisions by increasing liquidity 
even more rapidly to prop them up? 
The next few years will reveal whether the 
mechanisms set in motion by Greenspan’s policies 
are sustainable or whether the whole process will 
become increasingly vulnerable to collapse brought 
on by one bubble too many. The Age of Turbulence 
suggests that the system is manageable and can 
thrive when in the capable hands of someone like 
Greenspan. Will the same be true of his perhaps 
less capable successors?  
